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Martin Heidegger, Rector :
The Enigmas of 1933
E. M. CarmichaeI
Martin Heidegger had two lives. There was Martin Heidegger as revealed in
the philosophical texts, primarily Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), published
in 1927. There was Martin Heidegger as concealed in the political texts, com-
mencing the 18th of May, 1933, with a short address delivered to students at
the University of Freuburg. Neither self (or identity) makes sense without the
other, not at the moment of their appearance nor today, and if we should ask,
as I believe we must, where or how we would discover the man Heidegger, or
rather, if we were to articulate the relationships between the texts representing
the author and his personal history, the responses can never satisfy us. To this
one note should be added: that the Heidegger searching for understanding in
the work following Sein und Zeit and particularly in the post-war period, the
Heidegger of everdarkening forests, narrowing paths, of precipices, punish-
ments that will not cease, that is, the Heidegger who speaks through the poe-
try of H6lderlin, who orders then breaks our silence by the long interrogation
held with the poet. In the Spring of 1933 Heidegger was elected rector of the
University of Freiburg, located in the former province of Baden. This was at a
time when the nazi 'form' was fleshing out and gathering force and at a time
therefore when its messengers were seeking greater accomodation, support, and
above all, greater voice in its INCEPTION within Germany as the party of
revolution. Nazism needed the honor of a based constituent voice. In the pages
to follow I shall present and comment on certain passeges of what is known
as the Rector'sAddress delivered by Heidegger the 27th of May, 1933, as part
of the program to celebrate his institution's university festival. Context can be
twisted to meet specification. But one figure can stand alone without the call
for redress. In Baden there were, and again we are speaking of 1933, two con-
centration camps, both in the town of Heuberg, built for the incarc~ration of
politically harmful persons, namely communists, pacifists, and social demo-
crats, who were destined for later transfer to and thus extermination at Dachau.
The setting does not lack for color, for mass, eminence or character. Atten-
ding were the Ministers of Justice and Culture of Baden, the Archbishop of
Fre iburg, notables of other universities. a certain von Gallwitz, retired artillery
general; and a captive array of students, who included nazi militants (SA)
formalized under the swastika banner, surrounded thIS spirited band. The mu-
sical program itself provides us with the tone that organizers must have delibe-
( 3 ) 586
Martin Heidegger, Rector: The Enigmas of 1933 (E. M. Carmichael)
rated at length: the Brahms overture Gaudeamus 19itur, Wagner's Huldigung
March, Hymn To The National Socialist Martyr Horst Wessel, and Song of
Germany. Transmission of the speech was broadcast by Freiburg Radio. Hei-
degger entitled it 'The Self-Assertion of The German University'. Excerpting
the major declaration of this most declarative work of inspiration while com-
menting on what I take as their essential mark is not without risks. It does
however point us straight at fundamental issues. Translation (mine) into Eng-
lish is denoted here by italics. Heidegger's own italics are rendered in upper
case.
Taking-charge of the rectorate means to take the responsibility of guiding
this fine school SPIRITUALLY. Those who will follow, students and
professors alike, owe their existence and tpeir vitality to their common
root within the essence itself of the German university. This essence does
not attain clarity at the level and force proper to it unless, from the first
and at all times, the guides are themselves guided -guided by the infiexi.-
bility of this spiritual mission, a mission whose constraints express the
very character of the German people's historical destiny.
Heidegger, we see, does not pose as the Fiihrer of the institution except as
Fiihrer among others· elected to the same role (s). The importance of the notion
Fuhrer is made even more crucial in the national design to which the "subjects"
(students and their professors) are appropriated. One does not belong to a
school as much as to a force that overwhelms the particular and exalts the
collectiyity. Hence the educator cannot assume individual status. Rather he
must be shared, having been entrusted with the mission of carrying on what
supercedes his capacity. Heidegger invokes the transcendent again in the figure
of inflexibility: we should read will-to-face-and-resist the temptation to deviat~
from the paths that lead outward from the center, the German national center
or essence. Heidegger places himself ~t that point in no-time, the latter because
the commencement towards history and event originates now in the spoken
convenant to which the address is, we may say, devoted. The emphasis is on
project. But true to Heideggerian style. constraint is loaded into the charge.
He does not outline a concrete obstacle. For the concreteness comes loaded in
the pressure-chamber of the expression, constraint. Clarity lies alongside. Light
is "not transparent but a variant or an interval that must be registered in accord-
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ance with the rules (forms) or results of the constraint. Who defines that
constraint and by what principles? If we follow the sense given here, the
source which radiates is transcendent and historic: the politics which ennobles
and must be seized in its inception.
Are we capable of rising to this challenge? Whether we are or not, the
question still remains: are we, the teaching staff and student body who
make up this fine institution, truly and as a community rooted in the
essence of the German university? Does this essence possess in authenticity
the force necesssary to put its mark on our existence? It so, it is by virtue
of its being deeply DESIRED by us. But who would doubt this? We can
see as a community that the essential and prevailing character of the uni-
versity lies in its independence, which must be maintained. Yet have we
really considered what this demand for independence requires of us? For
independence means: taking upon ourselves the task and determining for
ourselves the means and the terms of its realization. But do we know
WHO WE ARE OURSELVES, WE, in other words, the teaching and
student bodies of the university, the finest of the German people's educa-
tional institutions. Is it even possible for us to know this without the most
constant and disciplined self-meditation?
What puzzles at first reading is the vehemence of the address, its spirit of
exhortation, measured against the apparent conventionality of its language,
part directive, part homily, achieved by the use of interrogative (always in ca-
dence) devices. I would choose to point attention, first, at the other side of
Hindependence" presented by Heidegger, for while he does make the case for
the autonomous university, the capacities and worthiness required of cUS' to
reach and sustain successful independence are never conceded out of hand. In
the guise of teacher rather than judge, accused rather than accuser, Heidegger
will wait to set the conditions of their release (revindication). He will also
force the choices available by positing the ground and very justification of the
mission to be carried forward (forward and out) in the triad, national origins-
national destiny-science, which founds in its most elemental state the REVO-
LUTIONARY project of the nascent nazi regime:
The self-assertion of the German university lies in the original and
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common willing of its essence. For us the German university stands as
that lofty institution which, based on and developed through science,
educates and elevates the guides and guardians of the destiny of the Ger-
man people. To will the essence of the German people is to will science in
the sense of willing the historic spiritual mission of the German people as
a people which sees and understands itself in its State. Science and Ger-
man destiny must in this willing of essence, reach full force AT THE
SAME TIME. And this is what will come about if, and only if, ON THE
ONE HAND, we of the community of professors and teachers, rereveal to
science its innermost necessity while, ON THE OTHER, we ourselves
endure the German destiny in its most extreme distress.
Astonishing declaration should we ask to what this science, embraced in its
essence, aspires and probe the possible significance of the words, "at the same
time". Heidegger does not shrink from the rigors of possible solutions/resolu-
tions. Picture to yourself at this instance the burden of an educator or resear-
cher assigned the task of clarifying national destiny in concert with other
driven elements, other compelling forces, while performing his conventional
duties, and the impact is there. Ignore for the moment the obviously grave
implications of being ineluctably subject to the particular, to the finite political
scales of reality, to the status of chasing-chasen, to make (in Heidegger's sense)
and to being-made German sans cesse. Instead focus on two incomparably
prodigious assumptions. One is that the educator (Heidegger himself, therefore)
has prepared himself to penetrate to the essential nature of his discipline
(philosophy in this instance) and to see there in its most arresting state, a
prophesy, or a reflection, of the German state (or nature) in its most original
form. Heidegger proposes a method (we should say, a grounded methodology)
according to which that quest should be guided, a path towards the commence-
ment, as he expresses it, of his people's spiritual-historic existence:
This commencement is the eruption of Greek philosophy. It is there
that for the first time that Western man, by virtue of the genius of a peo-
ple and the language of this people, encounters before him the BEING IN
TOTALITY which he questions and apprehends as that being which he
is. Every science is philosophy whether it knows or whether it wishes this
to be so. Every science stands under the influence of this commencement
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of philosophy. From this it draws the force of its essence on the condition
that in general it remains at the height of that commencement.... [What
is relevant with respect to approaching Greek thought is not] assimilating
PRAXIS to theory but, on the contrary, to understand theory as the
highe5~ form of authentic PRAXIS. For the Greeks science is not a cultural
good but the very core of the most basic determinant of the framework of
human existence within the State.... Our knowledge of things remains
c8,ptive to the sweeping power of destiny and will fall before its forces.
Dual references, reflexion of the Same: Heidegger wants to make history,
which is explicitly revolutionary, but as a purist who refuses to make choices
bet\veen the theoretic and the practical vision and for whom science, inaugu-
rating thought, belongs in its most penetrating being to philosophy and there-
fore to the Greeks ..,For a moment let us leap ahead to the extraordinary work
on Nietzsche completed seven years later in 1940. in which a discussion of the
Platonic notion of imitation and art leads Heidegger to consider 'physis', the
essential structure of being, as it appears in The Republic: " ... PHYSIS still
Ineans emergence for Plato, as it does primarily for the first beginnings of
Greek philosophy, emergence in the way a rose emerges, unfolding itself ...
PHYSIS is the primordial Greek grounding word for Being itself, in the sense
of the presence that emerges of itself and so holds sway. Man cannot produce
the IDEA: he can only be stationed before it." Heidegger celebrates the vio-
lence of that exchange between human existence and its presence to the radiant
disclosure of the secret and exalting movement of being itself. Transcendence
in thought, far from being a spiritual exercise, calls into question human exis-
tence itself and it is the questioning itself which, as it constitutes the proper
axis of philosophical discourse, must therefore embrace the scientific discourse.
Heidegger will reach towards the present moment of his audience and his
constituency only in name. There is a strangely scriptural vehemence to his
invocation of the Greek tradition, as much to say that through its ground, the
present is secured: authenticity secured, at least in the moment of freedom of
apprehension. But the true aim of the violence is manifest, in my reading,
when Heidegger compels his constituency to identify national destiny, national
politics, and race itself in the nation state, through HIS vision of the exalted,
that is, within the system of references produces out of the Greek text (however
the body of this tradition is approached or made use of, one faces in the end a
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series of texts). Destiny receives its own, its proper, forging in the fires of
exclusion. Exclude those persons to v/horn the tradition is alien. In the ultimate
exclusion, refuse the exclusivity of t.he total project, obliterate the differences
that constitute philosophical discourse: do not recognize the ground of the
exceptional, the other. Destiny in these terms is preempted rather than pro-
mised, thrust upon rather than shared. Savor the enthusiasm in whose light
temporal orders become indistinct, in whose light the commencement reads as
irrepressibility. Heidegger's enthusiasm overwhelms his once modest presump-
tion of an address to be Usigned and delivered".
The commencement has fallen into our future, which is where it resides
until we are enjoined to rise to its greatnes. Only by strict adherence to
the greatness of the commencement can science become t he necessity of
our existence SPIRITUAL world of a people is not the superstructure of
a race and certainly not an arsenal of usable knowledge and values but its
greatest powers of conservation of earth and of blood: in terms of the
force of the most intimate emotion of its existence and in terms of the
highest power it posesses capable of shaking itself to the very roots. A
spiritual world alone is what secures a people's greatness. For by bringing
into play the constant tension between the will to greatness on the one the
one side and, on the other, the laissez-faire of decadence, it gives its rhythm
to the step taken by our people fowards its historical future.
Implicit in Heidegger's strategy are the distinctions presupposed between
classes of scientific research, between modes of transcendental consciousness
or apprehension, and between various politicaljpropadeutic fields of application
(meaning university and state operations, what belongs and does not belong
to them by right), but these can be discussed later. What fascinates us is the
primacy of this other order of business, the sacred agenda. We refer to his
obsession with future-pasts, his annhilating nostalgias, and the experimental
theater into which the university would ultimately be transformed, or, in light
of the title of the address, asserted towards, that is, affirmed and transfigured.
Heidegger reveals elevated heights, but as we remarked just above, weighted
with refusal, haunted by the immanence of failure, this is affirmation with a
difference. He takes up the instruments of administration, the instruments
of concrete realities, German or otherwise :
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The German student body's resolve to experience the destiny of the
German people in its moment of greatest distress is one source of will with'
respect to the essence of the university. This will is genuine inasmuch as
the German student body, thanks to new student rights, comes under the
law:()fjts own essence and, at the same time, defines this essence from the
first. To accord the law to, oneself is the highest freedom. ',' Owing to its
completely negative nature and therefore its inauthenticity, the oft-vaun-
ted ({academic freedom" of the German university is being driven out. It
was really'a carefree situation inimical to .genuine projects' and intentions
-laxness in whatever one carried or failed to carry out. The concept of
freedom of. the Germati student is now redirected to its. truth. From this
source emanate the German student's future obligations and service.
Heidegger therefore does not shrink, at least not here, from hand to hand
combat, (HAND figures prominently in the Heideggerian readings of the world
an image that presumes the terms of the praxis/theory antinomy to which we
have referred: I say (presume' rather than (bridge' because, while the latter
suggests reCiprocal and passive function, 'presume' is invested with the force
ofan agent, of conviction that stands prior). The ({German" student's authen-
ticity is in his words an accusation of the present. Not the simple temporal
present of the university and its daily realities but the deepening present
(presence) of FORCE that spills over into the violence of the future and threa-
tens (Heidegger raising high the threat) to wreck what had hitherto reigned as
({law" within the institution, wreckage that - and this is fundamental- would
be the trace element of a drive into truth, which conduct can only mean deli-
vering spiritual and intellectual energy to the cause of national destiny, a
euphemism in this context for national socialism. Professors have two choices.
One is allegiance and conscientious support. The other is dissociation.
Heidegger envisions three areas of reponsibility that will define the present/
future generation of students. The first is archetypal: work service within the
((popular" community, sharing the burden of the laboring classes and thus
gripping by hand the hand that moves the earth. Heidegger alludes then to
their spiritual mission, the third area, the one that cuts closest to the heart of
the matter J the track that leads from obscurity to light, from ignorance to the
path cleared for the German people by the student and by the professional
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elite of society whose powers encompass the "matricial" forms of human being
itself. Indeed knowledge, he affirms', is not at the service of the professions but
the reverse.
But this knowledge is not for us the undisturbed consciousness of essen-
tialities and values-in-themselves ; it is the blade that cuts to the very
quick of the awesome power of a being's existence
He continues to expand that theme to include, as one must now assume, the
state as structural fulfillment of spiritual restlessness. Once the ultimate arbiter
in human affairs has been enlightened, made worthy of the authority of state,
what separates students from the higher orders of military and intellectual
service must be, what el se, but the nazi hierarchy itself. We would not be
exaggerating in saying that the professional elite exercises a precarious status.
For Heidegger rather sublimates student roles. He would have devolve upon
them the victor's privelege of announcing the terms of engagement and occu-
pation. In a word, the revolutionary vanguard is where the rector would,
obviously, wish it to be, between the combat corps under the Fiihrer's rule and
the undefined university administration and teaching elites. Heidegger will
analyse the factors that alienate the professional corps of the university. His
examination must inevitably (following the lines of argument) track the nature,
for example, of faculty incompetence in science as primordial condition for the
liberation of certain peoples. Moreover, seizing the nature of the axis of control
and ideology is integral to this enterprise: Heidegger, that is, must and will
politicize the unrealized objectives of the scientific inquiry by appropriating
them to the student. We could say "virtual" student but that would imply a
contemplative, cautiously reasoned argument, which is hardly the case here,
as the student is invested with all the intentional significance of the militant,
the agent, the revolutionary who functions within the state framework. That
framework embodies the second of the areas of student responsibility.
Heidegger finishes his address in rousing style. Answering the new regime's
call for university reform in the image of the Fiihrer's likeness, he reprises the
the principle arguments in a form of assault on the complacency of the non-
constituent, the equivalent of an enemy force, the non-combattant. Reference
to the "new science" is all but unavoidable: without it the rector becomes an-
other Great Pretender. It founds the project and very lifeblood of the intellec-
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tual institution. It redeploys the positions presented to readers six years
previously in Sein un Zeit when Heidegger pronounced upon man's fall in the'
modern age from the truth or light of being. Above all it promises refuge, a
helping hand, to the fledgling regime of terror and destruction. This is less
accomodation of interests than it is the celebration of a pact formulated in
history (Heidegger's version), which" decreed for the present/future, calls for
the renewal of an "original" humanism.
The will of the essence of the teaching corps must be roused to assert
itself in the interest of the simplicity and ecompassing dimensions of
knowledge as it concerns science. The will of the essence of our students
must endeavor to reach the highest levels of clarity and intellectual rigor;
further, it must make known, through its relationship to the people and
their state, the form of the essence of science by endowing the latter with
exigence and determination. Both of these wills must also assert them-
selves mutually in combat. The total capacity of will and throught, all the
strength of the heart and of the body must be engaged THROUGH com-
bat, be affirmed and maintained AS combat. We have chosen the respon-
sible combat of those who question and who, with Karl von Clausewitz,
say: "I declare myself free of futile hope by embracing the refuge offered
to me by destiny"
To close this first account of Heidegger's descent into political waters, a few
observations drawn from another context will help to put what must appear
as abstract or oblique into more immediate perspective. Although Heidegger
attempted to distance himself in (1945 in the text Das Rektorat 1933-1934.
Tatsachen und Gedanken) from the impact of what was pronounced the 27th of
May, the address did not go unnoticed. The impact was considerable, within
and without the academic world. The Nazi university student journal hailed
the address as the one single rectoral address deserving of dissemination and
support. What mattered most were its revolutionary vision and programmatic
concerns. Heidegger in fact defeated his competition in this respect, in this
sordid exhibition. The nonofficial press as always reprocessed officially sanc-
tioned and promulgated material. Heidegger was in danger of becoming, if not
a household name, then an instant classic in the Nazi vernacular. Typical of
the reception and also the tenor of press response would be the comment that
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appeared in The Rheinische-Westtalische Zeitung, which wrote that he had,
H ••• for the first time succeeded in showing the relations between the university
anc;l the total state to those who together would form the future of the German>
university in the German State.~' One of the most important of the nation's
elite bourgeois dailies, Berliner Bcrsenzeitung, remarked that few· such addre-
sses had "... created such a fascinating effect while still challenging its audi-
ence." Moreover the residual impact of the address was also telling: even
through to the summer of 1936, that is, subsequent to Heidegger's disaffection
(the famous "break") with official national socialist leadership, the address
retained it status as a reference point for university reform. Further, its mar-
tial fervor did not of course escape the observer For contrary to what Heide-
gger would claim in the 1966 interview published posthumously (May, 1976)
in Der Spiegel, the thematic division of the address (knowledge/work/state
military) did in reality serve to create the impression that he had proposed in
favor of this concrete insertion of the military component into the province of
the universty. We have seen that for ourselves. Early into the interview the
question put to him was whether he had not thought to establish the priority
of the service of knowledge particularly in light of the Nazi insistence on the
greater importance of the other two "pillars" of responsibility. The response is
instructive.
It's not a matter of "pillars". If you read me carefully you would have
understood that although the service of knowledge does occupy the third
place, the meaning assigned puts it above the others. What should be taken
into consideration is that work and defense are based, as every human
activity is, on a certain body of knowledge from which it draws light.
Among the more curious betrayals committed by Heidegger were the con-
siderable favors accorded by the rectorate to Nazi militant students. Living
accomodations were arranged in .castles, and ultra-conservative fraternities
based on the ritualistic orders of the Crusades were encouraged. Heidegger's
deeply romantic nostalgia ascended into this vision of the ascetic warrior
pursuing truth on horseback, in monastic cells, and through painted landscapes.
His tenure as rector ended after only ten months. Shortly thereafter, in 1934,
the year before Hitler's race laws deprived German Jews of their citizenship,
now with the prospect of becoming the director of a Prussian teacher's college,
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Heidegger proposed specific educational objectives and measures which again
reflected his obsession with the life dedicated to higher causes, the life of revO-·
hitionizing austerity and vision: total committment to service. The questions~
that perm.eate the career (word of vulgar associations): in whose name, in
whose cause,in whose persecution, would the Heideggerian 'experiment .in
heraldic fascism commit that service?
* * *
Heidegger would not retract for the remainder of his life what had been
clearly staked out as his ground and as theirs, the new regime's. Statements
Were made to the effect that he recognized his "stupidity", that the excesees so
comn1itted were not repeated. But Heidegger had become in the years following
Hitler's defeat a luminous figure obsessessed with the defense of the German
language as the mistress of the Greek and for that reason a phantom structure
for which he, the philosopher, would seek definition: definition in the sense of
contour and' elementary articulation created at the interior' of Being. Yet
Being surrenders itself as absence and as the forgotten. Futility, that is, angui-
shes the seeking and the formulation of evidence or appropriation. Discerning
within German the steps that contravene loss, contravene the necessity of the
"phantom structure" would bring Heidegger closer to the failures of completion
of Sein und Zeit. An expensive fragmentation took place: a working with
remoteness itself. The fascination in Heidegger, what makes the Heidegger case
compelling study, were the political consequences of committing oneself to an
ideology from outside, from a philosophy that could tolerate distancing itself
from rationalized political behavior. This raw piece of political behavior. Hei-
degger"s refusal to "deconstruct" the original avowal of "nascent" nazism
could now only confirm the motives which were responsible for the Address of
May, 1933. His continued identification of theUni ted States and the USSR as
the forerunners in civilization's trajectory into total and final vacuity we should
understand as perspicacity itself: Heidegger the exterior man looks in. Heide~
gger permits the inscription of time present and time on the quickened path.
With the brilliant analyses of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, the occultation
by the French intelligentsia (the philosopher's chief line of support) of the
unflattering yet fundamental elements in Heidegger were, to borrow a phrase;
put through a shredder. Caught in a landscape controlled by Marxism, Critical
(13) 576
Martin Heidegger, Rector: The Enigmas of 1933 (E. M. Carmichael)
Theory, and structuralism French intellectuals who wanted to revive the philo..
sophical project outside of that containment discovered in Heidegger sources
of material and critical ground both historical and, for them, unconfined, capa-
ble, that is, capable of embracing critical theory and priveleging what has since
been sold under the term of de-construction. The object of cult, of speculation
and deification, Heidegger reestablished a different brinkhead : exegesis of
particular poets and hermeneutic analysis, which refuge into wilful and pro-
tracted denial did not, of course, impede the gratuitous slide into the region of
cult furies. Heidegger's anti-democratic and anti-modernist pronouncements
made enemies but also confirmed consolidated support bases. His appeal to
the academic industries had been guaranteed within three years of the publi-
cation of Sein und Zeit but in the 1950s and 1960s Heidegger's presence in
European thought was nothing less than monolithic. That meant that within
German thought ultimately resided the possibilities of the freedom of thought
and the liberty of action. A manifest absurdity but worn with resolution The
outcry that greeted the 1987 publication in Paris of the book by Victor Farias,
Heidegger et le nazisme, revealed to what degree myths die hard. Heideggerians
had always known of the master's nazi committment but the Farias book
delivered page after crushing page of incriminating evidence, much of which
was new, and however tenuous the procedural methods used may have been,
the massiveness of the indictment produced symptoms of vertigo in more than
one circle. The FerryjRenaut study study proceeds on the assumption that the
need for the construction of an alternative humanism has never been more
urgent, has never been, as the Heidegger controversy developed into a political
polemic, as clearly put before us.
Following from here the FerryjRenaut critique of Heidegger's metaphysics
of subjectivity (Introduction to Metaphysics, Letter On Humanism), in which
the philosopher's preoccupation with the truth of being forces him to sacrifice
another set of truths, those which define the values a man creates of himself
and therefore his potential to clear a space in which to build a lawful state,
however much divided by conflict and ambivalences (for example, rewarding
behavior which violates constitutional law because it conforms to a certain and
sanctioned tradition or custom): the perfectibility of the person, this illusion
that most violates what Heidegger holds as impregnable and truth-worthy in
the search to which man in his finite existence (Da-sein) is "geared to" or
thrown-towards, performs a kind of complex maneuver which will permit a
575 (14)
person to act at liberty. That Heidegger's foundational concept, developed in
Sein und Zeit, of the forgetfulness of being becoming the instrument of an
arbitrary forgetfulness (belonging to man but not as a necessary attribute)
which confers to the form its own formless expanse, preempts a philosophy of
political right. Further, if Heidegger wishes to refute classic ethnocentrism in
the name of the authentic, he would then deprive the subject of that free-from
materiality, his faculty of imagination, upon which rational political control
would be based.
Heidegger's own adventure with notions of the supranational destiny of the
German nation camouflages this well-spring of contradiction: indeed his
anguished preoccupation and fear of the rootless, deracinated and wayward
fCspecies" produced on this planet by history results in a peculiar apology
idolatry. The Kantian view of the transcendent man who emerges unburdened
by racial and biological determinations returns us to Rousseau and to U le
neant" from which that trajectory towards a determination-free status in the
first instance emanates. It is in this sense that Habermas interprets Heidegger's
deviation under the impress of national socialism as precisely that, a deviation,
but already implicit in the ontological status assigned, in Sein und Z eit, to
man's pre-scientific (or pretechnical) spirit. The course of historical conscious-
ness would necessarily have to manifest itself in inauthenticity and subjective
aberration (megalomania). Only a German Da-sein would be capable of grapp-
ling with the lfallenness' which would then strike at and define the human
condition, imperil and disfigure its capacity for recognizing truth.
In the preceding pages I have confined my attention to a particular histori-
cal context with which Heidegger's ideological and philosophical positions
reached a common point or a source held in common. That context prefigured
what would become the great drama of the century, in Asia as well as in
Europe. Ironically or not, the time present appears in all its instability and
precariousness to have moved beyond what one would normally term the
ideological. Our fascination with the violence and the conflicts which have
marked indeed empowered the evolution of the institutions and the network of
reality that constitute our stream of time may be the one response available to
us for making sense of that absence. The intensity of emotion aroused by the
Heidegger polemic in Europe should be understood, at least in part, in this
larger, inclusive context. The pathos of Heidegger's protracted embrace of
fascism offers in itself a path to retreat. After all, it would not require much
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imagin'ation'to produce an' apology based on the complexity of the man's
experiment in national socialism, his aborted attempt to carry through on any-
thing approaching a successful political program, or one could revive the figure
of the demented and visionary romantic ill-equipped to trade exchanges in the
violent sphere of political action. For my own part, I would urge rather that
We examine the matter of the political initiative seen in the light of ethical and
socio-economic· motives. That is, examine the violence endemic to the society
towards which we are directed in terms of the broader issues one confronts in
rea.ding history, in reading Heidegger within it. One can only concur with
Ricoeur'simpassioned call for a demarcation of the ethical with relation to the
specificity of the political and the economic spheres. In renewing Hegelian
d}stinctions between the autonomy of the economic motors of a society (there~
fore an abstract entity) and the deep-rooted sources of the historical com-
munity's character (profoundlY'concrete, therefore narrative) he defines alter-
native strategies for making sense of the senseless and for convincing us that
the insertion of the ethical pursuit alongside (as intersection) polity and econo-
my constitutes the necesssary condition for the creation of the democratic state
in which conflict and power are regulated by the freedom to create consensus
and thus a plurality 'of voices.
Eric Weil's: judgement that the individual in modern society is unsatisfied
isnot one that VI/ill provoke heated controversy. It does offer terrain for bring-
ingtagether two of the themes that I wish to touch upon in conclusion. I
believe that the contradictions brought to light in our examination of Heide-
gger will thus be clarified in a context to which our present and future are
bound.
One is exclusion. The most telling events of the current decade have been in
my'view the accident at the nuclear plant site in the USSR and the production
of the "Stealth" bomber in the United States. In the former case we witnessed
an extraordinary crime committed against the people for whom the project
was designed to help. Moreover the effects of that disaster, as we now know,
were not at all limited to national boundaries. Later investigation revealed a
history of earlier malfunctions caused in part by defective designs of the origi-
nal plant. But the critical factor was the continued violation of basic operatio-
nalprocedure and the policy of ignoring violations. Criminal responsibility
cannot be placed conveniently upon those in administrative positions. From
the higher reaches of centralized bureaucracy to the men and women employed
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, in the manual operation of reactor the potential for calamity of the the greatest
, magnitude was not only known and therefore ignored, but visibly and palpably
observed and condoned long before the final breakdown. Warnings went un-
I heeded, apparently because of the fear of reprisals of all sorts, not least being
j those directed at employment security.
The Stealth aircraft was built at staggering costs to the American economy.
The matter of whether the veil of secrecy was intended in the first instance to
protect contractors from the scrutiny of the impartial observer rings with all
the signs of pathological fear: whether the complicity of elected-government
representatives and the legions of the managerial/entreprenurial agents and
technical personnel required to carry out monumental research and manufactu-
ring projects in universal silence not only violates the letter and apirit of a
lawful society but has resulted in one more permanent series of toxin generating
corpses. Not surprisingly, news of the technical failures of the aircraft design
became a project in disinformation, assuming a certain equivalence with the
product itself. In any event, the democractic electorate has emerged as dama-
ged as the strategic posture of the United States. A product designed to intensify
conflict in the world's confrontational theaters (therefore promoting the initia-
tive of "first strike" nuclear strategists), the lethalized impact of the Stealth
(one appreciates the symbolic reversal denoted by the name) aircraft affects
the very core of democratic institutions, that is, their legitimacy and their
survival as we approach the 21st Century. Where the Stealth and Chernobyl
issues interpenetrate are at the points that frame the efforts of the persons
responsible for their operation and production: efforts which by concerted
policies of deceit excluded the RIGHTS of citizens to know what manner of
service was to be offered to them in the name of efficiency and security.
I have sought to personalize the discussion of what was intended by exclusion-
ary powers. This should not however deflect from the "formal" considerations
which Weil's judgement brings to bear on the nature of social and political
constraint. If we examine the other side of the exclusionary process, we come
up against the irrationality and imprudence of the workplace itself in the
technological market structure of our economics. Markets which define human
relatios in ways that we cannot make intelligible to ourselves. What Marx and
Hegel attributed to the process of modern labor in all of its forms as RATIO-
NAL motivation and justification have never appeared less pertinent or more
distortional. Work, being imposed from without and removed in its effects
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from those held responsible for it, ceases to be rational endeavor and prevails
over the forces of common sense and common sympathies which form the
basis of what WeB termed the decison-making capacities of the organic historic
community, itself the foundation and raison d'etre of the modern state. As
Ricoeur has observed, the flight of the individual in Western and Eastern
societies from the public sphere to the atrophied spaces of private concern
reads as the great indictment of that market-oriented direction into which we
have been drawn neither for nor against the forces of will recognized as proper
to us as individuals.
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